Much as in previous recessions, the number of applications to public disability insurance programs increased sharply during the Great Recession. We find that the composition of applicants also changes across business cycles. For example, applicants during economic downturns, and especially during the Great Recession, are younger, better educated, higher income, and more likely to have recent work experience. However, we find only mixed evidence supporting the theory that the increase in applications in downturns is caused by healthier applicants who apply to disability programs only because they are unemployed.

The design of default investment options in defined contribution (DC) pension plans is of critical policy relevance, as many members of DC plans are incapable or unwilling to choose investment strategies among the great variety offered to them. There is increasing international consensus that some type of life-cycle strategy is desirable for default options, with decreasing risk exposure as the individual ages. However, the specific allocation to risky assets (such as equities) at different ages is a matter of much debate, both in academic and policy circles. There is also an on-going debate on the relative merits of deterministic investment strategies with a fixed glide-path over the life-cycle and dynamic strategies that take into account some supposedly long-term features of asset returns, such as mean-reversion.

Pensjonskassekonferansen 2013 avholdes 23. – 24. april 2013

Recent reforms that aim at reducing the upcoming burdens of population ageing might seriously harm low income individuals. An increase in old-age poverty and disability will be the result.

This study argues that the promotion of union goals could have positive, negative, or neutral effects on risk adjusted return performance. Moreover, the union’s ability and incentive to use pension assets to promote union goals will vary with the design of the pension.

Defined contribution plans, predominantly 401(k)s, are the primary source of personal retirement savings for American workers, making the investment decisions within these accounts a salient policy concern. These decisions are a result of two separate actions: the mutual fund options selected by the employer’s plan administrator and the specific funds chosen by the participant.

The self-employed workers make up a small but significant minority of the workforce in many OECD countries. Moreover, transitions into and out of self-employment have become much more common for a larger group of workers. It is therefore of critical importance to review and assess the pension schemes available to self-employed workers across OECD countries.

We analyze the impact of changing employment patterns and pension reforms on the future level of public pensions across birth cohorts in Germany. The analysis is based on a rich dataset that combines household survey data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) and process-produced microdata from the German pension insurance.

Pensions are inherently risky because they are long-term contracts, which complicates financial planning for individuals and governments. If things turn out better than expected, who will reap the gains? If things turn out worse, who will bear the cost? No one wants to bear risk, but, in most cases, someone has to. Risks in pension systems have, in the past, been poorly measured or even just ignored.

The 2008 financial crisis sharply reduced the assets and funded levels in state and local pension plans. The drop in funding means that state and local governments have to raise additional revenue to fill the gap.

Levealdersutviklingen er av vesentlig betydning både for offentlig og private pensjonssystemer. Usikkerhet om utviking av levealderen er i de tradisjonelle befolkningsframskrivingene håndtert ved at en lager alternative, deterministiske framskrivinger. Disse er usikre.

Pensions are inherently risky because they are long-term contracts. These contracts can involve up to four groups of actors: individuals, governments, employers and financial-services providers. Uncertainty about the future complicates planning for all these actors: if things turn out better than expected, who will reap the gains? If things turn out worse, who will bear the cost? No one wants to bear risk, but, in most cases, someone has to. Risks in pension systems have, in the past, been poorly measured or even just
ignored.